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disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action 
a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if 
the number of women choosing a increases. Analogously, a 
woman becomes better off if more men or fewer women choose 
the same action as she does. Existence proofs are constructive: we 
build simple ”best reply” algorithms that converge to an 
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We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ﬁnite congestion
and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called
men and women. A man choosing an action a becomes better oﬀ if the num-
ber of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing
a increases. Analogously, a woman becomes better oﬀ if more men or fewer
women choose the same action as she does. In addition, there could exist
pairwise congestion or pairwise coordination eﬀects depending on whether a
player becomes worse or better oﬀ when more couples (consisting of a man
and a woman) choose the same action as (s)he does. Existence proofs are
constructive: we build simple ”best reply” -algorithms that converge to an
equilibrium.
As an example, we can think of a group of women and men choosing
among the several bars or restaurants in a city. The decisions of the men
and women do not solely depend on the characteristics of bars (wine lists,
type of music played, etc.) but also on the number of other men and women
coming to the same bar. Women are the better oﬀ the more men choose the
same bar and the worse oﬀ the more other women choose the same bar, for
men vice versa. Or, the players could be males and females of some other
species searching for feeding and breeding grounds (see Milinsky (1988)).
For another example, think about actions being holiday resorts and play-
ers being consumers and ﬁrms. Firms decide where to build a hotel (or other
facilities) and customers choose where to spend their holiday. Competition
among ﬁrms in the same location is good for the customers, but they don’t
like the area being too crowded. Or ﬁrms could be deciding in which tv
-channel or newspaper to advertize and customers could be people deciding
which channel to watch or which newspaper to buy.
1Technically our model is closest to Milchtaich’s (1996) and Quint and
Shubik’s (1994) model. In their model, there are only congestion eﬀects, or
in our terminology, all players are men. It is shown in both of these papers
that there is a very simple algorithm converging to equilibrium. The players
are introduced in the game one by one. Each new player chooses an action
to maximize his utility given the actions chosen by the players already in the
game. When a new player has made his move, old players may revise their
actions. The revision phase continues as long as there are any players who
want to deviate. If all players are satisﬁed in their current actions, a new
player enters and chooses an action, and so on, until an equilibrium is found.
We use the following algorithm for games with pairwise congestion prop-
erty: First we form as many man - woman pairs as possible, and leave the re-
maining players (men) single. Single players choose ﬁrst following the Milch-
taich or Quint-Shubik -algorithm. After that the couples enter the game
one by one. The woman makes the ﬁrst choice for the couple. In the revi-
sion phase, men and women may change their actions individually (so the
originally ”married men” need no longer follow the orders of their ”wives”),
but in the opposite order they entered the game. This algorithm is modiﬁed
slightly for games with pairwise coordination property.
Rosenthal (1973) was the ﬁrst to deﬁne the class of congestion games and
to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (his deﬁnition is slightly diﬀerent
than the one adopted by Milchtaich (1996) and Quint and Shubik (1994)).
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the class of potential games, which
includes Rosenthal’s congestion games, and proved that these games admit
a pure strategy equilibrium. Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a) proved
the existence of a strong pure strategy equilibrium in the class considered
by Milchtaich (1996) and Quint and Shubik (1994). Konishi et.al. (1997b)
2deﬁned a class of games with positive externalities and proved the existence
of pure strategy equilibrium in this class by constructing a potential function.
In our model men get positive externalities from women and vice versa,
but there are negative externalities (congestion eﬀects) within groups. We
are not aware of other papers where the existence pure strategy equilibria is
proved in models exhibiting both positive and negative externalities.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 notation is
introduced. The main results are presented in Section 3, and Section 4
contains examples.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = {N;(Si)i∈N;(ui)i∈N} be a ﬁnite normal form game. That is, the




Si −→ R is the utility function of player i. We assume that Si = A
for all i ∈ N and denote a strategy proﬁle by s, s ∈ AN. The game has two
types of players, that is N = M ∪W, where M and W are nonempty disjoint
sets. We will call players in M and W as men and women, respectively.
Let ns(a) be the number of players who chose an action a in a strategy
proﬁle s and let ms(a) and ws(a) be the number of players i ∈ M and j ∈ W,
respectively, who chose an action a in a strategy proﬁle s. We assume that
there are functions u : A × N × N −→ R and v : A × N × N −→ R such that
ui(s) = u(a|(ms(a),ws(a))),for all i ∈ Mand s such that si = a,
ui(s) = v(a|(ms(a),ws(a))),for all i ∈ Wand s such that si = a.
To get simpler notation, we will in the sequel denote the utility of a
man from the action a by u(a|(m,w)), where m is the number of men and
3w is the number of women choosing a. Similarly, the utility of a woman
from the action a is denoted by v(a|(m,w)). A game G is now given by
G = {A;M,u;W,v}.
There are several assumptions made when utilities have this kind of neat
expression. First, player i0s utility from s does not depend on the identity
of his opponents j making choices sj = b, but it may depend on whether j
is a man or a woman (anonymity inside groups, see Konishi et.al. (1997a)).
Secondly, player’s utility from an action a depends only on the number of
players from each group choosing this same action (independence of irrelevant
choices, see Konishi et.al. (1997a)). Thirdly, all women have the same utility
function and all men have the same utility function (symmetry inside groups).
The next assumption is called population monotonicity (PM). We as-
sume that the payoﬀ of any man i (any woman j) decreases when more men
(women) choose the same action as i (j) (negative population monotonicity
NPM) and increases when more women (men) choose the same action as i
(j) (positive population monotonicity PPM).
Deﬁnition 1 A game G has the PM-property if for all a ∈ A the conditions
NPM and PPM hold:
(NPM) if m0 > m then u(a|(m,w)) ≥ u(a|(m0,w)), if w0 > w then v(a|(m,w)) ≥
v(a|(m,w0));
(PPM) if w0 > w then u(a|(m,w0)) ≥ u(a|(m,w)), if m0 > m then v(a|(m0,w)) ≥
v(a|(m,w)).
The following condition is called pairwise congestion (PCG). If a player
prefers a to b, and one man and one woman join the group who chooses b,
then a is still preferred to b.
Deﬁnition 2 A game G has the PCG -property, if u(a|(m,w)) ≥ u(b|(m0,w0))
4implies u(a|(m,w)) ≥ u(b|(m0+1,w0+1)), and if v(a|(m,w)) ≥ v(b|(m0,w0))
implies v(a|(m,w)) ≥ v(b|(m0 + 1,w0 + 1)), for all a ∈ A.
The following condition is called pairwise coordination (PCD). If a player
prefers a to b, and one man and one woman join the group who chooses a,
then a is still preferred to b.
Deﬁnition 3 A game G has the PCD -property, if u(a|(m,w)) ≥ u(b|(m0,w0))
implies u(a|(m+1,w+1)) ≥ u(b|(m0,w0)), and if v(a|(m,w)) ≥ v(b|(m0,w0))
implies v(a|(m + 1,w + 1)) ≥ v(b|(m0,w0)), for all a ∈ A.
The condition PCG implies that a suboptimal action for a player cannot
become an optimal one if a new couple chooses this action. The condition
PCD implies that an optimal action stays optimal if a new couple chooses
this action. The condition PCG (or PCD) is therefore less demanding than
a monotonicity condition that requires that player’s utility decreases (in-
creases) if a new couple chooses his/her action.
3 Results
We consider ﬁrst games with population monotonicity and pairwise conges-
tion properties. It turns out that in such games there are pure strategy Nash
equilibria. We assume w.l.o.g. that there are at least as many men as there
are women. Consider the following algorithm for games G = {A;M,u;W,v}:
THE ALGORITHM. Index the players by natural numbers so that the
ﬁrst |W| odd natural numbers are indices for women and the ﬁrst |M| positive
even natural numbers are indindices for men. So the highest index for a
woman is 2|W| − 1 if there are any women, and the highest index for a man
5is n = 2|M|. We describe the algorithm separately for the cases when there
are (A) no women, (B) both men and women and |M| ≥ |W|.
(A) Choose an action a for man i = 2|M| that maximizes his utility
u(a|(1,0)). Suppose each i among the k ≥ 1 men with highest indices
have given some action a(i) that maximizes his utility u(a(i)|(m,0)) when
in total m men choose this action. Then give the man j = 2|M| − 2k an
action b(j) that maximizes his utility u(b(j)|(m,0)) when in total m men
choose this action. Next let the men revise their actions one at a time so
that at each stage the man with the lowest index is given the opportunity
to change his action ﬁrst. Only those men for whom there are actions that
are strictly better than their current choice are allowed to revise. When
looking for better actions, all players think myopically that after his choice
there will be no more revisions. If at some point actions for all men i =
2|M| − 2k,...,2|M| are such that none of them wants to revise any more,
then the next man j = 2|M|−2k −2 is given an action b(j) that maximizes
his utility u(b(j)|(m,0)) given that in total m men choose this action. The
algorithm converges if and only if all men have assigned an action and none
of them wants to change his action any more.
(B) First all the ”single” men 2|W|+2,...,2|M| (if |M| > |W|) are given
an action by using the algorithm (A) (if this algorithm stops), and after that
the ”couples” (2|W|−1,2|W|),...,(1,2) are introduced in the game in that
order. New couples are brought in the game only if none of the old players
wants to change his or her action. When the couple (i,i + 1) enters, the
woman i chooses the action x that maximizes her utility v(x|(m+1,w+1)),
where m and w are number of men and women choosing x before the couple
(1,2) entered the game. The revision stage is again such that the player with
lowest index may ﬁrst revise his or her action if he or she strictly gains by
6doing so. In particular, the man i+1 need no longer choose the same action
that was originally chosen by his ”wife” i. The algorithm converges if and
only if all players have assigned an action and none of them wants to change
his or her action any more.
It is clear that if the algorithm converges, and the resulting strategy
proﬁle is s, then s is a Nash equilibrium. Our main theorem gives suf-
ﬁcient conditions for the convergence for generic games. We call a game
G = {A;M,u;W,v} generic, if u(a|(m,w)) 6= u(a0 |(m0,w0)) if (a,m,w) 6=
(a0,m0,w0) and similarly for the women’s utility function v.
Theorem 1 If a generic game G has the properties PM and PCG, then the
algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Convergence of the case (A) of the algorithm follows from Theorem
2 of Milchtaich (1996) and Theorem 3 of Quint and Shubik (1994). The
algorithm actually converges in our case always immediately without any
action revisions by any man. We give the proof for completeness.
(A) Let G be a game having properties PM and PCG in which there are
M men. If there is only one man, let a be a choice that maximizes the utility
u(x|(1,0)). Because there are no other men, there will be no revisions.
Suppose then that the algorithm converges always when there are at most
k−1 ≥ 1 men, and that the convergence happens always immediately without
anybody wanting to revise his action.
If there are k men in the game G, then by the induction assumption
the man with index i = 2 is brought into the game at some stage. Let
a be the action that maximizes the utility u(x|(t,0)) of the man 2, given
the choices of the old players. Then if a player i > 2 has chosen an action
7b 6= a, this action is still utility maximizing by PCG. None of the men who
chose a would like to change her action, since a maximizes the utility of the
man 2 and all men have identical utility functions. Therefore the algorithm
converges immediately without any revisions.
(B) Let G be a game having properties PM and PCG such that |M| ≥
|W| > 0. We proceed by induction in the number of ”couples” (i,i + 1), i is
a woman and i + 1 is a man.
Suppose that there are k couples and any ﬁnite number of single men.
By the case (A) above, the algorithm applied to the single men converges.
Assume now that the algorithm converges when there are at most k −1 ≥ 0
couples (i,i + 1).
Denote by (1,2) the k’th couple that is introduced in the game, when all
the other players are choosing equilibrium actions, k ≥ 1. (The proof is the
same whether or not (1,2) is the only couple in the game.) So let a be the
action that maximizes v(x|(m + 1,w + 1)) where m and w are the number
of men and women choosing x before 1 and 2 enter the game.
In the revision phase, the player with the lowest index who ﬁnds a strictly
better action may change his or her action ﬁrst. By PCG, none of the players
choosing b 6= a wants to change his or her action, and clearly no woman
choosing a wants to change her action either. So the only players who possibly
could gain by changing action are the men choosing a. The algorithm gives
the man 2 the ﬁrst chance to revise his action, and suppose that he ﬁnds
action b strictly better than action a and deviates to b.
The man 2 thus has moved from a to b. No other man wants to deviate:
the only possibility would be some man wantig to choose a, but then this
same man should have chosen b before the couple (1,2) entered the game.
So only some women might want to change action. The woman 1 is asked
8ﬁrst if she can strictly increase her utility. Three cases arise: (i) woman 1
does not change her action, (ii) woman 1 moves to b also, and (iii) woman 1
moves from a to c 6= b.
(i) Woman 1 does not change her action:
If the woman 1 cannot increase her utility the algorithm has converged. To
see this, notice that no man with action a or b can increase his utility by
changing action. So if some man wants to revise, it must be some man i > 2
who, at the moment, chooses an action c 6= a,b. The only action that could
be strictly better than c for him is a. But the man 2 just moved from a to b,
so b was strictly better than c for man i prior to the introduction of the couple
(1,2) to the game, a contradiction. For women i 6= 1, the only possible new
action is b. But if there are such women, then woman 1 wants to deviate to
b as well. Namely, if this were not true, then the woman i 6= 1 should have
chosen a just before the couple entered the game rather than her current
action. So if woman 1 doesn’t want to deviate to any action, the algorithm
converges and woman 1 chooses a and man 2 chooses b in equilibrium.
(ii) Woman 1 moves to b also:
Suppose then that the woman 1 can strictly increase her utility after man
2 has moved from a to b. If woman 1 wants to choose b rather than a then
she can make this move before any other women. By PCG and induction
assumption no man i > 2 choosing c 6= b wants to choose b. Similarly by
induction assumption, no man i > 2 who chose c 6= a wants to deviate to a.
The choice b maximized the utility of man 2 before woman 1 moved there,
and therefore b by PM his utility only increases when woman 1 moves to
b. This holds true for all men choosing b since they have identical utility
functions, and therefore the algorithm converges.
(iii) Woman 1 moves from a to c 6= b:
9In this case, no other woman wants to change her action any more, the reason
being the same as in case (i). However, there could be some man wanting to
choose c as well. We will show that in this case man 2 also wants to move
from b to c. Namely, if this doesn’t hold, then by genericity of the game,
man 2 would strictly prefer b to c at this moment. Let k ≥ 0 be the number
of men choosing c, m ≥ 1 the number of men and choosing b, and h ≥ 1 the
number of men choosing x at the moment. Let w1,w2,w3 ≥ 0 be the number
of women choosing c, x, and b at the moment. If a man wants to change
from x to c, the following inequality must hold:
u(c|(k + 1,w1)) > u(x|(h,w2)) (1)
On the other hand, if the man 2 does not want to change from b to c,
u(b|(m,w3)) > u(c|(k + 1,w1)) (2)
But the two inequalities imply that the man who wanted to change from
x to c, had chosen b and not x before the couple (1,2) entered the game, a
contradiction.
To sum up, if there is at least some man who wants to move from x to
c after the woman 1 moved from a to c, then also the man 2 wants to move
from b to c. Since man 2 is allowed to change his action ﬁrst, he will in fact
move from b to c.
But now the algorithm converges, since all the single man who didn’t
choose c before the couple (1,2) entered the game, now ﬁnd c even worse
alternative by PCG. Since c is a best choice for 1 and 2, no player choosing
c wants to revise his or her action. But in such a case man 2 wants to
deviate to c as well, and if man 2 wants to deviate to c, then he makes this
move before any other men. The algorithm then converges to equilibrium
where the couple (1,2) chooses c. If man 1 doesn’t want to choose c, then
10the algorithm converges to equilibrium where woman 1 chooses c and man 2
chooses b. This completes the proof.
The algorithm doesn’t seem to require excessive computational or predic-
tive powers from players: players (or couples) enter the game sequentially,
see what choices the other players have made so far, and based on that make
their utility maximizing choices. Players do not try to predict the future:
they do not try to guess what those players will do that enter the game later,
or how the old players will react when new players enter the game. The fol-
lowing result shows that convergence is quite fast despite of players behaving
in such a myopic manner.
Proposition 1 Given a generic game G satisfying properties PM and PCG
with |M| men and |W| women, |M| ≥ |W|, the algorithm converges in at
most 3|W| + |M| steps.
Proof. As long as there are only single men in the game, no man ever wants
to revise his action he took when he entered the game. So it takes |M|−|W|
steps before the ﬁrst couple is introduced in the game. When the ﬁrst couple
arrives, the longest path before the next couple is brought to the game is
the following: the woman 1 chooses a for the couple (1,2), then the man 2
deviates to b 6= a, then the woman 1 deviates to c 6= a,b, and ﬁnally the
man 2 deviates to c (see part (B) in the proof of Theorem 1). So it takes at
most |M| − |W| + 4 steps before the second couple ienters the game. But it
takes at most four steps for every new couple (i,i + 1) before they both are
satisﬁed with their actions and before a new couple enters the game (see part
(B) in the proof of Theorem 1). Since there are |W| couples, the algorithm
converges in at most |M| − |W| + 4|W| = 3|W| + |M| steps.
We will next analyze games in which the pairwise congestion (PCG) is
replaced by pairwise coordination (PCD). We don’t know whether or not our
11original algorithm converges in these kind of games, but by modifying the
algorithm slightly, we can quarantee convergence.
THE MODIFIED ALGORITHM. Index players as in the original algo-
rithm, and assume w.l.o.g. that |M| ≥ |W|. Index also the actions by the
ﬁrst k natural numbers. The stage (A) is exactly as it was before: the single
men choose in the reverse order of their indices, and the revision phase is as
before.
If there are some woman, then the stage (B) is divided into two substages
B1 and B2.
(B1) Given the choices of single men, check if there is any action a such that if
all couples choose this action, then no single woman or man wants to deviate
unilaterally. If there are several such actions, choose the one that is best for
women. If the set of these optima for women is not singleton, choose the one
from this set that is best for men. If this does not resolve ties, then choose
the optimum that has the lowest index. If there are no action a such that
if all couples choose this action, no single woman or man wants to deviate
unilaterally, then move to B2.
(B2) This stage is the same as stage B in the original algorithm.
Again, if the modiﬁed algorithm converges, the resulting strategy proﬁle
is a Nash equilibrium. The next result says that the modiﬁed algorithm
converges for generic games satisfying PM and PCD.
Theorem 2 If a generic game G has the properties PM and PCD, then the
modiﬁed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium either
all couples choose the same action, or there is no action chosen both by men
and women.
12Proof. The case (A) is the same as in Theorem 1 since there are no woman.
Let G be a generic game having properties PM and PCD such that
|M| ≥ |W| > 0.
(B1) Suppose there is an action such that when all couples choose this
action (plus the single men who chose this action in stage A), then no single
man or woman wants to deviate from a. By genericity of the game, there is
a unique best such action for women, a. Since no player choosing a wants
to change action, the only potential deviators are men choosing some b 6= a.
The ﬁrst such deviator is a man with the lowest index i, and his new choice
must be a. After that, no player choosing a has any incentives to deviate, so
again the only potential deviators are men not choosing a. The next deviator
could choose either a or the action that the ﬁrst deviator chose before the
couples entered the game.
Continuing the revision stage, we will show that there will never be such
an instance that some of the players choosing a would like to change action.
Suppose to the contrary. Then there is also the ﬁrst instance when a player
choosing a wants to deviate.
Assume ﬁrst that this player is a man. Then since the players choosing a
have the lowest indices, the man 2 may change his action from a to his new
optimum b. But this is possible only if some man has just changed his action
from b to some c 6= a. But then man 2 had changed his action alredy in the
previous stage, a contradiction.
Assume then that the ﬁrst player wanting to deviate from a is a woman.
Again, woman 1 may change her action as soon as she ﬁnds a new optimum
b. The only reason why b is now better than a for her is that there are
now more men choosing b than there were immediately after stage A. Then
the men choosing b get a strictly lower utility than the men who chose b
13immediately after stage A. But this is a contradiction with PM: there are
now at most as many men choosing actions x 6= a as there were immediately
after stage A, so there is no reason why more men should be choosing b now
than immediately after stage A. But then the algorithm converges, since the
game is now essentially a game between single men only. Clearly all couples
choose the same action.
Suppose therefore that there is no action such that when all couples choose
this action (plus the single men who chose this action in stage A), then no
single man or woman wants to deviate from a, and move to the next stage.
(B2). The stage A has converged, the stage B1 has failed, and therefore
the couples enter the game one by one just like in stage B of the original
algorithm. When the ﬁrst couple enter, it chooses the action a that maximizes
the utility of woman 1. Then man 2 must ﬁnd a strictly better action b, since
otherwise a would by PCD be an action that guarantees the convergence
already in stage B1. After man 2 has chosen b, woman 1 may ﬁnd another
best action c, but again c = b is not possible. For the same reason, the best
action b or c for woman 1 cannot be chosen by any other man i > 2 either.
Therefore, all players must be satisﬁed with their actions as soon as woman
1 and man 2 have found their best actions.
Excatly the same argument applies at each stage when a new couple
enters the game, so the algorithm converges, and there is no action chosen
both by men and women.
Theorems 1 and 2 establish the convergence of the algorithm and hence
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in generic games. In non-
generic games where there may be multiple best replies to a given strategy
proﬁle, the algorithm should be redeﬁned so that the action taken at each step
is uniquely deﬁned. But it is not clear how to redeﬁne the algorithm in such a
14way that it converges. In fact it is not clear that any such redeﬁned algorithm
converges. The following result establishes that in all games satisfying either
PM and PCG, or PM and PCD, the algorithm can be redeﬁned in such a
way that it converges to an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Given a non-generic game G satisfying either PM and PCG,
or PM and PCD, the algorithm can be redeﬁned in such a way that at each
step of the algorithm, the action chosen is uniquely deﬁned, and the algorithm
converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that G satisfying PM and PCG is generic otherwise ex-
cept that are two proﬁles (a,m,w) and (a0,m0,w0) such that u(a|(m,w)) =
u(a0 |(m0,w0)). Construct a new game G1 by breaking this indiﬀerence by
adding (or subtracting) a suﬃciently small amount  of utility to u(a|(m,w))
(or from u(a|(m,w))) in such a way that G1 satisﬁes PM and PCG, and that
the other strict preferences in games G and G1 are the same. Clearly this
can be done and G1 is generic.
Deﬁne Gn like the game G1 except that  is replaced by /n, for n =
1,2.... Then each Gn is generic, and there is a Nash equilibrium s(n) selected
by the algorithm for each n. Since there are only ﬁnitely many actions, there
is naturall number K such that (i) s(n) = s(K) for all n ≥ K and (ii) the
algorithm produces an identical path to the equilibrium for all n ≥ K.
Then s∗ = s(K) is a pure strategy equilibrium of the game G. Consider
all the ways one can deﬁne diﬀerent version of the algorithm by deﬁning the
choice in a diﬀerent manner when there are indiﬀerencies. There are only
ﬁnitely many such versions since there are only ﬁnitely many actions and
players. At least one of them produces for game G the same path to the
equilibrium s∗ = s(K) as the original algorithm produces for the game GK.
15One can show by induction that if there are in G many instances where
proﬁles (a,m,w) and (a0,m0,w0) are indiﬀerent, then again one can construct
in the similar manner a sequence of generic games converging to G. The claim
holds of course also if G and the generic games satisfy PM and PCD.
4 Examples
We assumed that inside groups all players are similar, that is, all women have
the same utility function and all men have the same utility function. Next
example shows that if we drop this assumption, the game may not have a
Nash equilibrium.
Example 1 Let G be a three-person game with action set A = {a,b,c},
and W = {1} and M = {2,4}. Player 1 is a woman, and players 2 and 4
are men. Action c is strictly dominated for players 1 and 2, and action b is
strictly dominated for player 4. The utility function for player 1 , the woman,
satisﬁes:
v(b|(1,1)) > v(a|(1,1)) > v(b|(0,1)).
The utility function for player 2, one of the two men, satisﬁes:
u2(a|(1,1)) > u2(a|(1,0)) > u2(b|(1,1)) > u2(b|(1,0)) > u2(a|(2,1)).
The utility function for player 4, the other of the two men, satisﬁes:
u4(a|(1,1)) > u4(a|(2,1)) > u4(c|(1,0)) > u4(a|(1,0)).
These functions can easily be extended to all action-(m,w) -pairs in such
a way that the condition PM is satisﬁed. Note that player 1 must choose
either a or b in every Nash equilibrium. If she chooses a, then 2 must choose
b, since 4 will deﬁnitely choose a. But then 1 would like to deviate to b,
16so there is no Nash equilibrium where 1 chooses a. If 1 chooses b, then 4
will never choose a, and therefore 2 chooses a and 4 chooses c. But then 1
would like to deviate to a, so there is no Nash equilibrium where 1 chooses
b. Therefore there exists no Nash equilibria in the game G.
Next we study the eﬃciency of the equilibrium produced by the Algo-
rithm. The next example shows that this equilibrium need not be eﬃcient,
in fact, there may be another equilibrium in the game that Pareto dominates
the one selected by the Algorithm.
Example 2 Let G be a two person game with A = {a,b,c,d}, W = {1}
and M = {2}. The functions are as follows:
v(a|(0,1)) = 1 u(a|(1,0)) = 0
v(a|(1,1)) = 7 u(a|(1,1)) = 1
v(b|(0,1)) = 0 u(b|(1,0)) = 3





v(c|(1,1)) = 5 u(c|(1,1)) = 2
1
2
v(d|(0,1)) = 2 u(d|(1,0)) = −1
v(d|(1,1)) = 6 u(d|(1,1)) = 5
These functions have the properties PM and PCG. Applying the Algorithm,
ﬁrst player 1 chooses for the couple {1,2} action a. Next player 2 gets chance
to revise.his action. He can increase his utility, so he deviates and chooses b.
Player 1 now gets 1 by choosing a so she also wants do revise her action. She
chooses c. Player 2 no longer can increase his utility and the Algorithm thus
stops. In this equilibrium, player 1 gets utility 41
2 and player 2 gets utility
3. However, if both players choose d, then this is also an equilibrium, and
17player 1 gets utility 6 and player 2 gets utility 5.
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